[For information on the warfare of the Sanusi, particularly in reference to the Italian-Sanusi wars, see Category 648.]

175 eastward toward the Nile Valley. It is not possible to
167 determine the exact conditions associated with this migration, but they probably parallel later movements which are connected with tribal conflicts over land and water rights. In 1689, Bedouins from Libya raided Egyptian oases in the Western Desert (Murray 1935:29). From this date on, for a period of some forty years, records show a continual movement of Bedouins out of Libya into Egypt. Some groups went as far as the Nile Valley and were eventually assimilated into the peasant population there. Tribal movements at the end of the 17th century involved whole tribes and also tribal sections and fragments. Thus in some cases, authority relations arising from territorial bonds were dissipated; but in other cases, political ties were strung across the Libyan Desert from Cyrenaica to the Nile Valley. "Today there is not a Cyrenaican tribe, or even large section, which has not some of its members in Egypt, often whole lineages" (Evans-Pritchard 1954:49-50).

175 Evans-Pritchard's study of the Sanusi, valuable for
619 its analysis of Italian colonial records, shows that the
•726 Awlad 'Ali were driven from Cyrenaica by its sister tribe,
167 the Harabi, with the help of the Turkish rulers of Libya.
[648] This took place, he says, about 150 years ago. When the Awlad 'Ali arrived in Egypt, they found the Hanadi tribe already there. In a chain of conflicts, the Hanadi had displaced the Banu'Una, forcing them into the Nile Valley:

175 then came the Awlad 'Ali.
619
726 Around the year 1800, the Awlad 'Ali were able to
167 defeat the Hanadi with the help of another Cyrenaican tribe dwelling in the area, the Jumi'at. The Jumi'at were a vassal tribe who changed their allegiance from the Hanadi to the Awlad 'Ali after this war. The Hanadi, as the Banu'Una before them, were forced into the Nile Valley. Today, they
[131] live in Sharqiyya Province and are no longer distinguishable from the peasant population.

175 According to Evans-Pritchard, the Awlad 'Ali were still
619 in possession of eastern Cyrenaica in 1800. Then there occurred
726 "long and savagely fought" wars ending with the expulsion of
114 the Awlad 'Ali. But this time schedule seems unlikely since the Awlad 'Ali were already at war with the Hanadi when
175 Napoleon landed near Alexandria in 1798. The Bedouin war has
648 been amusingly described by the French historian Lacroix (in
181 Murray 1935:30) who accompanied the Napoleonic expedition:

> At five o'clock, the first Bedouin were seen on the flank of the army, and shortly afterwards one saw four or five hundred; it was the tribe of Henady, the fiercest Arabs of these deserts. They were almost naked, swarthy, and lean; their horses seemed wornout hacks; save for the helmet, it was Don Quixote as represented in the engravings ...if these five hundred Arabs had been Mamelukes, they would have been able to obtain a great success at this first moment, when the soldiers' imaginations were alert and ready to receive any impression, but these Arabs were as cowardly as the Mamelukes, who had charged an hour before, were brave.

562 593 554 182 578 in Bedouin society, that is, the role of wife-daughter. The principles of patrilineality and cognation do not work against each other when the girl marries outside her corporate group, nor does her new dual role present a case of role conflict.

562 593 554 182 578 On the contrary, the wife-daughter role functions to bind together two groups which are structurally differentiated by the rule of patrilineality. During time of peace, the wife-

*613 [431] [628] [574] daughter acts as a bond-maker by carrying gifts back and forth between the two groups, often bringing some of her younger patrilineal relatives back to her husband's house or tent for short visits. During a time of conflict or war, the

562 593 554 •[726] [584] Bedouins point out, she is the only person who can cross the battle lines unharmed. She is a match-maker as well as a peace-maker. Often she influences the selection of mates by individuals in both her husband's group and her father's

562 593 554 582 group. The Bedouins say that "after the bint 'amm, a man should marry his bint khal ("mother's brother's daughter") because she is like his bint 'amm." Usually, over a period of a few generations, a given direction in marriage is sustained (see Figure 10), and it is one function of this wife-daughter role to accomplish this important political action.

562 593 554 *613 182 The role of wife-daughter, then, may be seen as one important aspect of what Fortes (1953:33) calls, "complementary filiation," the essential mechanism which provides the link between the corporate groups of al-Qasr society and the kin groups of the parent who does not determine descent.

619 Until two centuries ago Awlad Ali lived in eastern Cyrenaica.
173 After the death of Aqqar, his two sons, Ali (founder of Awlad Ali) and Harb (founder of Harabi tribe on chart), competed for the leadership of
619 the tribe. This competition involved their respective tribes in a
173 bitter war which existed for more than fifty years. In one of the major
726 battles between the two tribal segments, the Harabi segment with help
[648] from the Caramanli rules of Tripoli were able to defeat Awlad Ali and to drive them eastward across the Libyan-Egyptian borders into the Egyptian Western Desert. This happened about 150 years ago. At that time, the area was occupied by the Hanadi, a warlike cousin of Awlad Ali, who had established a system of dominance over the Murabiteen tribes who are believed to be the original inhabitants of the desert. The area also was inhabited by the Gemeiat tribe, which, although believed to have Murabiteen status, yet were not treated as clients of the powerful Hanadi, as were the other Murabiteen tribes in the area. With the help from the Murabiteen, Awlad Ali were able to defeat the Hanadi and to drive them eastward into the Nile Delta, where they settle now as cultivators.

619 During the rule of Muhammad Ali (1815-1848), the warlike Awlad
175 Ali were frequently used by the government to subdue the tribal uprisings
648 in the Delta and other parts of Egypt, and to hold the Mamlukes in check. There was no organized army in Egypt at that time except for a few remnants of the Turkish soldiers. The tribal population of Awlad Ali agreed to supply Muhammad Ali with fighting men on the condition that they would be provided with food and arms and also exempted

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[619] [173] connection to Gemeiat and insist that they are a Murabiteen tribe who acquired their relatively higher status through their assistance to Awlad Ali during their fight with the Harabi.

682 last two decades). But a feud in the form of extensive, long-term kill-
628 ing between two groups is very rare among Awlad Ali. The principle of life for life upon which a feud operates would rarely lead to a permanent settlement or peace, even when the sense of revenge is satisfied for the
682 moment. Among the group, this form of permanent settlement is more likely to be achieved through the payment of bloodmoney, or "diyya." The payment of the diyya is based on the assumption that the group has lost, in the deceased, an economic asset. It has been deprived of his services, both in supporting his immediate family and in the collective activities of his amar. This is illustrated in the distribution of the bloodmoney. Only half of the bloodmoney is paid to the immediate family of the victim, the other half being divided equally among adult males of his amar or vengeance group. This is intended not only to satisfy their sense of indignation and curb their desire for revenge, but also to insure that when the time comes to share in the payment of the bloodmoney, they will pay.

628 The cessation of feuds in the area seems to coincide with the cessa-
619 tion of inter-tribal and intra-tribal warfare. During the era of tribal
726 warfare, the killing of a tribesman meant the loss in the fighting power
178 of his tribal segment, and feuding, with its emphasis on life for life, had the purpose of restoring the balance in fighting power among the
[682] groups involved. Monetary compensations were not known in the area during that time, according to the informants' accounts, but they were usually restricted to cases where either the victim or the killer was a
178 non-tribal person. With the cessation of tribal warfare, the death of
682 a tribal member became more an economic, rather than a political, loss,
619
726

and compensation became more and more accepted in settling murder cases among the tribal population. Bloodmoney, or diyya," was established among compensations for injury in general. This scale of compensation is based on the amount of loss of normal activities the injury caused the victim with death being the total loss of such activities. The compensation for homocide is estimated at L.E.400 for intentional killing, and L.E. 300, for unintentional killing. Although reference here is made to "intention," the assessment of that intention and its definition are quite different from the general usage of that term among modern jurists. Among modern jurists, the term refers to a state of mind which implies that the offender willfully and knowingly committed the prohibited act. This means, first, that the person is able to recognize the nature of his act and to distinguish between right and wrong. Secondly, it means that the person was in a position to choose between committing the act and not committing it and took the former path. According to this view, individuals under temporary or permanent insanity, children under the legal age (the definition of which varies from one legal system to another), non-human beings and objects are not capable of having criminal intent, since they are incapable of having a will of their own. Similarly, individuals who are capable of having a will but, because of certain circumstances their freedom of choice was impaired, cannot also have intentions. Intention, then, in the modern legal conception is a psychological quality that connects the offender with the prohibited result or results. It is this psychological connection that differentiates in modern legal systems between murder and manslaughter, between attempted murder and simple assault, between first and second degree murder, and between justifiable

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

619 same time as the Jawazi, by a combination of the 'Awaqir, the
167 Magharba, and the Bara'asa, assisted by the Caramanli rulers of
131 Tripoli, and are now settled in the provinces of Fayum, Bani Suef,
Bahaira, and Minya in Egypt. The Jawazi used to live in the
*175 country now occupied by the 'Awaqir, and they now mostly live
in Minya Province of Egypt and in the Fayum. Another struggle
*[648] which greatly altered the tribal distribution in Cyrenaica was
two wars, the last about 1832, of the Magharba and 'Awaqir,
aided by their Jibarna kinsmen the 'Abid and 'Arafa, against
the tribes which occupied the *barqa* and the remnants of which
now range the littoral of the western Sirtica. These tribes are
known as *al-'Arab al-Gharb*, the Western Arabs.

*175 So, in 1800 the Harabi and Jibarna tribes, which are now in
131 undisputed control of all Cyrenaica outside the towns, occupied
619 only part of the country, mostly the central, and the most
northerly reaches of the western, plateau. The Jibarna were
cut off from the southern steppe by the Fawayid and Jawazi,
the whole of the *barqa* was occupied by *al-'Arab al-Gharb*, and
the eastern part of the plateau by the Aulad 'Ali. The wars by
• [776] which they drove out their rivals were long and savagely fought
and many incidents in them still form part of Bedouin tradition.

*175 As a result of these tribal wars the descendants of the Bani
Sulaim invaders of Cyrenaica and the Maghrib thus began to
131 return eastwards with a quota of Berber blood about the end of
167 the seventeenth century and pushed out the tribes they found
619 dwelling in the Western Desert of Egypt and pressed them into
the Delta, where they were absorbed by the *fallahin*. The first
intruders from the west were pushed to the Nile by stronger
tribes coming behind them and these by yet stronger. They
pushed one another like trucks on a siding. The Hanadi pushed
out the Bani 'Una and the Aulad 'Ali pushed out the Hanadi,
being themselves pushed on from behind by the 'Abaidat and
other Harabi tribes. Besides the migration of whole tribes from
Cyrenaica into Egypt there has taken place an exodus of many
tribal sections and fragments, owing to intertribal fighting, until
to-day there is not a Cyrenaican tribe, or even large section,
which has not some of its members in Egypt, often whole
619 lineages. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica know their kinsmen in
167 Egypt and sometimes when the price of sheep is low in the
602 Egyptian markets they leave their animals with them to sell on
439 their behalf when prices rise.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

mechanized surface vehicles and aeroplanes unknown in 1911. By the end of 1926 they had some 20,000 men in the field, mostly native troops, while after the opening round of the campaign the Sanusi probably seldom had more than 1,000 men on operational service at any one time. It was estimated that in 1923 they could put into the field 2,000 men armed with modern rifles and a few machine-guns and artillery pieces, and that in addition there were some 3,000 to 4,000 rifles among the tribes. With this superiority in mobility, fire, and numbers, the Italians were able, as in the first war, to push heavy columns in any direction they chose and to seize and fortify any point they pleased. Therefore, what is often called 'organized resistance' broke down very early in the campaign, if there can be said to have been such at any time, and gave way to guerrilla warfare in which sentries, advanced posts, supply convoys, and communications were subjected to sniping, raids, ambushes, and sabotage. Consequently the war was made up of a succession of small, and often unrelated, incidents in different parts of the country. Italian operational and intelligence reports and Bedouin stories about these hundreds of fights and skirmishes are not easily arranged into a coherent picture. The hundreds of bits and pieces are all very much alike in size and shape and colour, and the guide of any clear pattern is lacking. To attempt, therefore, to construct from them a complete mosaic of events would be a task alike arduous for the writer and confusing and unprofitable for the reader; and I shall not endeavour to do more than sketch the development of the campaign. It would, I think, be of assistance to the reader were I first to mention some very general features of the fighting, which are, indeed, features of guerrilla warfare always and everywhere.

II

The war, which was waged with increasing bitterness as the years went by, was not against all the Arabs of Cyrenaica, but only against the Bedouin, for the townsmen played no active part in the resistance, though they sympathized with it. Also, among the Bedouin, whilst there was no one who could be fairly labelled pro-Italian there were many persons, and even whole tribal sections, who remained passive, chiefly because of their

4: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1970 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Cyrenaica

cline in the total population of a tribe, then, the extinction of lines does not affect any order of segmentation superior to the tertiary. In this respect, the Cyrenaican genealogy differs fundamentally from those collected from the Nuer by Evans-Pritchard. In the quotation from his work on Nuer genealogies (1951), he asserts that telescoping occurs 'from the founder of the minimal lineage further up the line of ascent to the founder of the clan'. This major difference has serious implications for any discussion of lineage proliferation, but these must be left until the conditions under which proliferation is likely to occur have been analysed.

While it is true that the processes discussed are of importance in retaining the general shape of the genealogy, what is assumed so far is that the Cyrenaican population has been stable over long periods. Stability of population is not an unreasonable assumption to make for a people who live on the margin of subsistence in a country where extended periods of drought are not infrequent, though seldom leading, it is true, to actual famine conditions, but producing periodic and local food and water shortages. Disease, following quickly in the trail of shortage, it can be assumed, kept the relationship of total population to the natural resources fairly constant. What evidence there is does not support even this very general assumption, since it is known that there have been large-scale tribal wars in the past, and a certain amount of movement of tribes, some being displaced and others pushed eastwards into Egypt. Unless these shifts were caused by increases in the aggregate population and the consequent pressure on land and water, it is difficult to account for them. This consideration of possible overall increases in population in the past poses interesting problems related to lineage structure which cannot be adequately treated here. For the moment it is proposed to neglect possible increases in the total population during past periods in the history of Cyrenaica. The historical depth of the view now to be discussed is about seventy years, and for this period I have no evidence of any large-scale increases in population. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume a general stability of population for this period. But the vagaries of the Cyrenaican climate are such that, in a given year, one area might be well drenched with rain, giving excellent pastures for animals and good crops, while a nearby territorial strip might suffer a partial

5: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1967 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Cyrenaica

would have dropped in on the camp. In another situation, two men entered a shop in a market-place; inside sat two men of a feuding group who, instead of retreating hastily, greeted those who had just entered, and the latter returned the greeting with blows on the head from the butts of their rifles. Markets in Cyrenaica are recognized to be places of peace. In their actions the two offenders not only injured two others but also broke a taboo in a public place. The victim's group now had to avenge not only the injury but the insult that the breach of taboo carried with it, as well. In most feud relationships this is characteristic. It is never a matter of a simple homicide, but of killing a man at the entrance to his tent, between the centre poles of his tent, or taking the life of a minor, or an elder too old to carry arms and so on. Each successive killing ensures that the hostile relationships will be perpetuated.

The third step in this exposition, therefore, is the association of a state of feud with the secondary order of segmentation.

When the relationships between the structurally superior primary tribal sections are examined, the arguments against the necessity for peace are stronger than in the case of secondary sections. Relationships between them are few and irregular. Only occasionally do members of these groups meet, and then often accidentally; very many men of collateral primary sections are complete strangers one to the other. If a homicide occurs between two primary sections it is unlikely that any attempt to open negotiations will be made. The offender's camp may be raided by a *ghazi* recruited from the victim's kinsmen. There would be no question of these primary sections going to war. On a raid firearms may be used, but the action is limited to a strike-and-run affair. If the issue is joined and members of both sides are ranged against each other they fight with sticks to avoid large-scale slaughter: warfare must not be allowed within the tribe. Wars belong to intertribal relationships. For one of these wars, apart from hearsay evidence, some records exist. These tell of a war which took place during the period 1860 to 1865, in which there were planned campaigns, the organization of fighters into groups, and provisions for a labour force in the home territory, large enough to produce sufficient food to maintain an army in the field. During this war several hundred people were killed.

At this point, it is possible to summarize the stages in this exposition of the Bedouin view in diagrammatic form.



5: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1967 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Cyrenaica

The consequences of homicides in which secondary groups are concerned present an even greater variety, for now the span has expanded to include many more groups, with a total population of several thousand people. Groups of this order are spread over a much wider territorial range; some structurally distant groups are neighbours by virtue of their propinquity, while some structurally proximate groups are far removed territorially. Some feuds lie dormant for long periods. Others erupt frequently. Some homicides between these groups are followed by the 'laying down of the denial'—the feud situation with most acrimony built into it, for one denial, followed by a vengeance killing, is met by a second denial and so on, excluding thereby any chance of a settlement. In other circumstances the offender's group boast that they are responsible for a homicide, thus challenging the victim's group to a show of force. Only the more powerful tertiary groups would venture to do this, and it is only they who could meet a homicide against them with a spectacular show of force, compelling a weaker tertiary group (according to hearsay evidence) to break up and leave its homeland. The modes of killing in homicide differ in character. Some killings have been heinous and offensive in terms of general morality; their purpose is to sting the victim's kin to retaliate or to cause them to suffer general discredit and loss of status. While some parts of secondary segments are at feud, others are not. A homicide between affinally or matrilaterally linked groups, whether they are secondary or primary groups, is settled as quickly and as amicably as possible to prevent turmoil in their relationships. Feud concerns two tertiary sections, not the opposed secondary sections of which they are parts. Blood money and vengeance is not the responsibility of secondary sections, but of their respective tertiary sections.

At this point, a further statement concerning the external marriage links of tertiary segments throws further light on the feud. Previously it was stated that the competition between collateral tertiary groups for natural resources is indicated by a low rate of marriage between them. Their external marriage links reinforce the separation. One tertiary section, A, takes some of its spouses from section X of a collateral secondary section; A's collateral, B, takes some of its spouses from X's collateral, Y. A may be at feud with Y and B with X. The agnatic links between A and B, and X and Y do not mitigate the severity of the hostility in the two feuds, they exacerbate it. It would be erroneous to think of them as cross-cutting ties which promote peace. Stultified in the development of their hostilities by virtue of their territorial proximity and the sentiment associated with putatively close agnatic connexion, A and B are able to express hostilities indirectly through their linked groups X and Y respectively. During discussions of disputes, homicides, or rival claims to water, whether the disputants meet in the camps or in administrative offices in the villages, men from the matrilateral and affinal groups of the parties directly concerned are also present to do most of the shouting. In some cases I recorded a maternal relative was killed on behalf of an agnatic group to which he did not belong, although the latter accepted the responsibility. In the light of facts of this sort the lineage model obstructs analysis.

I now wish to make a few brief remarks about the relationships between collateral primary sections and paired tribes. Homicide, it was asserted earlier, results in raids and war between groups of these orders of segmentation respectively. Evidence can be adduced to show that both consequences have followed. The case usually cited to demonstrate that a single killing precipitates war between tribes is the

5:.Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1967 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Cyrenaica

celebrated war between the 'Abaidat and the Bara 'asa tribes occupying a large part of central and eastern Cyrenaica. This war took place a hundred years ago, so that the evidence is mainly hearsay, but it is significant that when asked for details of the groups taking part the Bedouin make it clear that the entire tribes were not at war—some sections on both sides are said to have remained on friendly terms. Yet when wars are discussed in a general fashion, the Bedouin insist that tribes confront each other as such. If it is pointed out to them that men might be ranged against their maternal relatives the Bedouin mumble apologetically that they would not kill their maternal relatives—a lame argument since in the heat of battle men cannot make this kind of discrimination. Details of other wars also illustrate the point that only parts of tribes face each other in strife, for though the stories of past events may be inaccurate there is genealogical evidence to substantiate their claims that certain groups were linked in the past, and in any case their statements assert that where these links exist they are not prepared to engage in hostilities. The several parts of each tribe, like the parts of primary and secondary sections, have as many different sorts of relationships as there are groups, and the general statement that tribes are warring units merely obscures the interest there is in their relationships. Tribes, further, lack the leadership to make war. I repeat that leadership does exist, but not even the greatest leaders, past or present, can rightly be described as leaders of their tribes, using the term in its structural connotation. Literature on the subject gives the impression that there are tribal leaders, because successive administrations have used the tribes and their divisions as a framework for attempting to rule the Bedouin, but the details of the power domains of individual leaders make it clear that they have little to do with the ordered divisions of tribes. A leader within part of one tribe may carry with him tertiary sections of another tribe, and if major hostilities break out between parts of these tribes, the sections of both which are joined as allies and related as kinsfolk will not fight against each other, for sections so linked enjoy stronger connexions than the structurally linked tertiary sections of a very large secondary section. Consequently the statement that homicide results in tribal war when the offender and his victim are members of two separate tribes is not merely incomplete, not merely a simplification, it is wrong.

A point which has been implicit throughout the second part of this paper needs now to be made quite explicit: groups do not come together in their respective structural genealogical orders. During my entire residence in Cyrenaica I did not see a group of agnates larger than a tertiary tribal section assemble for any purpose. It is true that the occasions when large groups are required to assemble are infrequent. It is also true that although the British Administration was serving a caretaker role only, it may have had an affect on the nature of tribal gatherings. Despite this qualification, there were several occasions when I expected tribal groups to assemble in lineage order if the fusion of sections in relation to like sections has any meaning in practice. Large groups of men did gather to dispute claims to wells, to argue about rights to ploughland, and to make peace. In every case that I recorded the agnatically closest groups of the main participants were absent, while members of genealogically more remote groups were present in strength. This statement applies to gatherings in the camps and in the administrative centres. One of the biggest gatherings I witnessed assembled in an administrative office in a village near the coast in the

9: Murray E.K-3,4 (ca. 1910-1935) 1935 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Egypt

to Dib by Ibn Khaldun, who calls Dib a descendant of Ka'b, the great-grandson of Suleim.[1] If this be true, the Jumei'at must be an elder branch than any of the Sa'adi tribes, among whom the Awlad 'Ali are included. But in actual fact, the Awlad 'Ali do not consider the Jumei'at as of Sa'adi origin, that is, descendants of Abu Dib and his wife Sa'ada, but despise them as Murabitin or vassals, though they pay no tribute.

All this may be interpreted to mean that they are among the oldest inhabitants of Western Egypt. They have been in Egypt "seven hundred years" according to one of their sheikhs, Sa'ad Bey el-Masri, and a pedigree given me by another, Sheikh 'Ilwani Suleiman, who lives near Sidi 'Abd el-Rahman, runs :



The Jumei'at of Mariut are all descended from El-Ashtar, while the offspring of the other five sons are settled in Beheira, Gharbiya, and at Ramla near Alexandria.

It is, of course, possible that their eponymous ancestor, Jumei'a, was an Arab of Beni Suleim descent, who returned to Egypt from the "Green Mountain", soon after the Beni Suleim invasion, and whose descendants became Murabitin by forming themselves into a religious community. But such religious fervour is not a Bedouin characteristic, but smacks rather of the fanaticism of the recently-converted, so I suspect the Jumei'at, in spite of their descent from Ka'b, to be mainly a remnant of the earlier Libyan population of the coast.

Prior to the arrival of the Awlad 'Ali, they were "Mrabit" to the Beni 'Una, and engaged in constant conflict with the Hanadi. Upon the rout and annihilation of the Beni 'Una, the Jumei'at were stirred up to revolt against the Hanadi by one of their holy men called Baqush. Outraged by their

[1] The more ignorant Awlad Suleiman have forgotten Ka'b's paternity, and confused him with the famous Arab poet Ka'b ibn Zuheir. See p. 287 for their version. And yet another Jumei'i version gives as their ancestor the Saint Ka'b el Ahbar.

[2] The "Friends" of the Prophet.

9: Murray E, K-3, 4 (ca. 1910-1935) 1935 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Egypt

619 oppression, he gathered his people and delivered a fiery
175 denunciation of his religion, during which he smashed his
726 rosary into pieces and mixed it with his horse's fodder;
792 Baqush then invited their kinsmen (?) the Awlad 'Ali, to come over from the "Green Mountain" and help them. To entice the Awlad 'Ali, he is said to have sent them samples of salt desert water and Nile water sweetened with sugar to illustrate the difference between the hardships of the desert and the comforts of the Rif.[1]

619 As recounted earlier, the Awlad 'Ali completely routed the
175 Hanadi and their allies, and drove them from the desert.
726 In the division of the conquered territory, the Jumei'at received a third, and, although they were still considered Murabitin, were released from the payment of tribute. They
[131] now live intermingled with the free sections of the Awlad 'Ali, all along the north coast of Egypt, and are numerous in Beheira, especially near Abu Hummus.

619 *Samalus.*—The Samalus are found scattered among the
[131] Awlad 'Ali on the northern coast and stranded among many of the Egyptian provinces. They once possessed a head sheikh Abu Sala at Minya, and colonies are recorded from Faiyum, Beheira, Menufiya, Gharbiya, and Sharqiya. An
[175] old paper from the Recruiting Department gives from
[162] seventeen villages in the Faiyum 775 mounted Samalus
[231] and 1,400 on foot, possessing 1,760 camels and 11,400
[312] sheep. Two important groups of wells, both called "Sawani es-Samalus" exist on the north coast, one about 50 kilometres east of Salum, and the other 20 kilometres south of Dhab'a.

[173] They say they came to Egypt, 400 strong, about 200 years ago, from the Wadi Samalus in the Jebel Akhdar, and their ancestor twelve generations ago was Nasr el-Hasani, of course an "Arab from Beni Suleim".

[175] In the *Description de l'Egypte*, P. D. Martin relates how
[726] in 1800 the Samalus of Faiyum were raided by a party of Ferjan, 200 strong, from Beheira.

619 *Shiheibat.*—These are a "Mrabit" tribe from the west with
186 an unenviable reputation, living near the Wadi Natrun. Sayed Idris, the former Senussi leader, says of them: "Most

[1] Dumreicher, 16. This is probably the "Sheik Abdall Gawyal Bagooshi" who wrote to Sir Sydney Smith in March, 1801, warning him of the approach of the French from Damanhur. Wilson, *History of the British Expedition in Egypt*, 371. (Rif = cultivated area.)